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Digital signatures guarantee the authorship of electronic communications. Currently used “classical”
signature schemes rely on unproven computational assumptions for security, while quantum signatures rely
only on the laws of quantum mechanics to sign a classical message. Previous quantum signature schemes
have used unambiguous quantum measurements. Such measurements, however, sometimes give no result,
reducing the efficiency of the protocol. Here, we instead use heterodyne detection, which always gives a
result, although there is always some uncertainty. We experimentally demonstrate feasibility in a real
environment by distributing signature states through a noisy 1.6 km free-space channel. Our results show that
continuous-variable heterodyne detection improves the signature rate for this type of scheme and therefore
represents an interesting direction in the search for practical quantum signature schemes. For transmission
values ranging from 100% to 10%, but otherwise assuming an ideal implementation with no other
imperfections, the signature length is shorter by a factor of 2 to 10. As compared with previous relevant
experimental realizations, the signature length in this implementation is several orders of magnitude shorter.
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Digital signatures [1] are ubiquitous in electronic com-
munication, used in, for example, Email and digital bank-
ing. They guarantee the provenance, integrity, and
transferability of messages. Currently used classical digital
signature schemes, however, rely on unproven computa-
tional assumptions [2], and may become insecure espe-
cially if quantum computers can be built [3]. Quantum
digital signatures (QDSs) [4–10], on the other hand, give
information-theoretic security [7], loosely speaking based
on the fact that nonorthogonal quantum states cannot be
perfectly distinguished from each other.
The first quantum signature schemes assumed tamper-
proof, “authenticated” quantum communication links.
Intuitively, this could be accomplished using parameter
estimation techniques similar to those used in quantum key
distribution (QKD). How to achieve this was explicitly
shown only recently [10,11]. In addition, recent quantum
signature schemes [6,9], including our protocol, do not
require long-term quantum memory. Importantly, this
means that quantum signatures can be implemented with
current technology, essentially similar to QKD setups.
“Classical” signature schemes with information-theoretic
security also exist [12–14], but rely on secret shared keys,
which could be accomplished using QKD. Quantum
signature schemes may have some advantages over
schemes relying on shared keys generated using QKD.
In particular, the quantum bit error threshold for a signature
scheme is in practice less strict than for distilling a secret
shared key [11]. In addition, the required postprocessing is
less demanding. Exactly what signature schemes are the
most efficient, however, remains an open problem.
Note that most QDS protocols, including this one, use
quantum states to sign a classical message. In fact, it is
impossible to sign a quantum message [15] using a non-
arbitrated scheme [16]. Arbitrated signing of quantum
messages has previously been investigated [17–20].
Since messages may be forwarded between recipients, a
signature protocol has at least three parties, a sender Alice
and two recipients, Bob and Charlie. In QKD, the com-
municating parties Alice and Bob are assumed to be honest.
In signature protocols, however, any of the involved parties
could be dishonest. Signature schemes should be secure
against forging (with high probability, only messages sent
by Alice should be accepted) and against repudiation (it is
unlikely that Alice could successfully deny having sent a
message that she did send). Repudiation is closely related
to message transferability. Transferability means that it is
unlikely that one recipient accepts a message as genuine,
but that this message then is rejected if it is forwarded to
another recipient. If there is no trusted third party, one way
to settle disputes is by majority voting. For three parties,
which is the case we will consider, nonrepudiation and
message transferability then become equivalent.
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In principle, quantum signature schemes are based on a
“quantum one-way function” which maps classical infor-
mation (a “private key”) to nonorthogonal quantum states (a
“public key”) [7]. In the simplest case, Alicewants to be able
to, later on, send a one-bit message “0” or “1”. For longer
messages, the scheme could be suitably iterated.
Generically, signature schemes have a distribution stage,
where the scheme is set up, and a messaging stage, when
messages are sent and received. The distribution stage could
be compared to leaving a sample of a handwritten signature,
e.g., when first opening a bank account. The messaging
stage typically takes place much later. In our quantum
signature scheme, the messaging stage is entirely classical.
In the distribution stage, Alice selects sequences of
quantum states, one sequence for each possible future
message 0 and 1. The states in the sequences are selected
from some set of nonorthogonal quantum states. The
classical information about what states Alice has selected
forms her private keys for the possible messages 0 or 1. The
quantum state sequences are the corresponding public keys.
Alice then sends copies of the public key sequences to Bob
and Charlie, who measure the states they receive. Since it is
impossible to perfectly discriminate nonorthogonal quan-
tum states, Bob and Charlie, or any other party, can never
obtain full information about Alice’s private keys.
Later on, in the messaging stage, when Alice wants to
send a message to Bob or Charlie, she sends the message
together with the corresponding private key. The recipient
of a message checks that the appended private key
sufficiently well matches the measurement results he
obtained in the distribution stage for the respective mes-
sage. In a real implementation, there will be mismatches
even for a private key sent by an honest Alice. However, if
imperfections are not too high, then anyone other than
Alice would cause a higher level of mismatches than Alice.
This guarantees security against message forging.
Similarly, to forward a message, a recipient forwards the
message together with its private key, received from Alice,
and the new recipient checks for mismatches with his
measurement record. Related to this, Bob and Charlie also
need to ensure that Alice cannot cheat, which would mean
that she could make them disagree about the validity of a
message. They achieve this by some kind of symmetriza-
tion procedure, done in the distribution stage [7,8,21]. In
our protocol, as in Ref. [21], Bob and Charlie randomly
forward half of their obtained measurement results to each
other using a classical communication channel, secret from
Alice. This channel could be realized using standard
quantum key distribution. To ensure that Alice is unlikely
to make Bob and Charlie disagree about the validity of a
signature, the threshold for accepting a message directly
from Alice should be stricter than for accepting a forwarded
message. For more details see Ref. [22].
In this Letter, we implement a quantum signature scheme
using continuous variable (CV) heterodyne quantum mea-
surements. Previous quantum signature schemes [5,6,23]
have instead used unambiguous quantum measurements.
We demonstrate that our scheme is viable in a noisy
environment using a free-space urban optical communica-
tion link. Finally, we show that, even when experimental
imperfections are taken into account, this scheme outper-
forms a recent scheme that uses unambiguous state elimi-
nation measurements [23].
Our QDS scheme is represented in Fig. 1, with the
protocol described below. The stages in the text correspond
to the respective numbers in the figure. We use a discrete set
of CV states, four phase-encoded coherent states jαi, jiαi,
j − αi, j − iαi, and heterodyne CV measurements [24]. The
same states were also used in previous QDS schemes
[5,6,23] and are similar to those used in some types of CV
QKDs [25,26]. In Refs. [5,6,23], however, recipients made
“discrete” quantum measurements with error-free (unam-
biguous) results, at the expense of sometimes obtaining no
result. Here we instead perform heterodyne measurements,
which always give a result, at the expense of increased
errors in the results. In many cases, unambiguous results
are required for a protocol to perform efficiently [27,28].
Surprisingly, we find that for this particular QDS protocol,
heterodyne measurements provide an advantage.
Distribution stages 1–4.—(1) For each possible future one-
bit message k ¼ 0, 1, Alice generates two identical copies of
sequences of phase-encoded coherent states, QuantSigk ¼
⊗Ll¼1 jψkl ihψkl j, where jψkl i is a randomly chosen phase-
encoded coherent state, jψkl i ¼ jαeiϕ
k
l i, ϕkl ∈ f0; π=2;
π; 3π=2g, and L is a suitably chosen integer. The state
QuantSigk is called the quantum signature, and the sequence
of phases PrivKeyk ¼ ðϕk1;…;ϕkLÞ is called the private key.
(2) Alice sends one copy of QuantSigk to Bob and one to
Charlie, for each possible message k ¼ 0 and k ¼ 1.
(3) Bob (Charlie) measures the states received from
Alice by performing a heterodyne detection [24,29] of the xˆ
and pˆ quadrature. He records the result of the measurement
and the associated position in the sequence l. For each
quadrature, the sign of the measured result determines
FIG. 1. Depiction of the scheme. The numbered parts relate to
the corresponding stages in the main text. Green dashed lines
indicate classical communication. Red lines indicate communi-
cation with quantum states.
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which state is eliminated. For example, if a positive result is
measured, then the state j − αi or j − iαi is eliminated,
depending on the measured quadrature. In this way, Bob
(Charlie) eliminates two states, one for each quadrature, for
each signature element.
(4) Symmetrization: Bob (Charlie), for each element l of
QuantSigk, randomly chooses with equal probability to
either forward the measurement results and position to
Charlie (Bob) or not, secret from Alice, who should not
learn the positions of the forwarded results. The resulting
sequences of measurement outcomes, after the forwarding
procedure, form Bob’s and Charlie’s “eliminated signa-
tures.” Bob (Charlie) keeps the results obtained directly
from Alice, and the results forwarded to him by Charlie
(Bob) separate. Therefore, he has an eliminated signature in
two parts, each of length L=2.
Heterodyne measurements will, even in the ideal case,
sometimes eliminate the sent state. If everybody follows the
protocol, the probability for this depends on the overlap of
the coherent states, and would be equal to 1
2
erfcðα= ﬃﬃﬃ2p Þ in
the ideal case with no loss or experimental imperfections,
where erfc(x) is the complementary error function. For
α ¼ 0, this probability equals one half, and quickly
approaches zero as α increases. Because of the unavoidable
errors, this measurement protocol is an example of
“ambiguous state elimination.” Since measurements are
performed immediately on receipt of the states, no quantum
memory is required, just as in Refs. [6,9].
Messaging stages 5–7.—(5) To send a signed one-bit
message m, Alice sends ðm;PrivKeymÞ to Bob.
(6) Bob checks whether ðm; PrivKeymÞ matches both
parts of his stored eliminated signature by counting how
many elements of Alice’s private key were eliminated
during the distribution stage. If there are fewer than saL=2
mismatches in each of the two parts of his eliminated
signature, where sa is the authentication threshold, Bob
accepts the message.
(7) If Bob wishes to forward a message, he forwards the
message and its corresponding private key. Charlie tests for
mismatches in the same way as Bob, but with a higher
verification threshold sv, to protect against repudiation.
Charlie accepts the message if there are fewer than svL=2
mismatches in each of the two parts of his eliminated
signature, with perr < sa < sv < 12.
In essence, the security of this scheme comes from two
sources. First, it is impossible for a forger to perfectly
determine the private key, since the used quantum states are
nonorthogonal. If noise is sufficiently low, the distributor
Alice has an advantage over any other party. Second, the
forwarding of measurement results ensures that, from
Alice’s point of view, Bob’s and Charlie’s measurement
records follow the same statistics. This means that if
Charlie uses a higher verification threshold sv than
Bob’s authentication threshold sa, then Alice’s probability
to repudiate can be made arbitrarily small by choosing the
signature length L large enough. An upper bound on the
repudiation probability is calculated using the Hoeffding
inequality [30] in the Supplemental Material [22].
Security against collective attacks follows from the fact
that different signature states are completely uncorrelated,
meaning that the optimal collective attack is an individual
attack on each signature element [6]. Security against
coherent attacks is left for future work, noting that due
to the forwarding of measurement results amongst other
things [31], methods from the security of QKDs cannot be
directly carried over. Security against coherent attacks has
nevertheless been analyzed for a related quantum signature
protocol [11,21]. We also assume that there are authenti-
cated quantum channels between Alice, Bob, and Charlie.
Some kind of parameter estimation procedure should be
used to replace this assumption, analogous to Refs. [10,11].
To successfully forge, Bob must guess a sequence of
states that meets Charlie’s verification threshold. For
individual and collective forging, the optimal forging attack
is to perform a minimum-cost measurement on the indi-
vidual signature states [31]. The minimum cost Cmin is the
minimum probability that an honest party will detect an
error in an individual signature element coming from the
forger, and is calculated in the Supplemental Material [22].
As long as Cmin is larger than perr, which denotes the
probability of a mismatch with the sent signature when all
parties are honest, the signature scheme can be made
secure by appropriately choosing other protocol parameters
such as the length L. Note that perr is determined from
experimental data. A final condition for a useful QDS
scheme is that it must be robust; i.e., it must succeed with a
high probability if all parties are honest.
The exact security definitions can vary and depend on
whether one party is more likely to be dishonest than the
others. As detailed in the Supplemental Material [22], we
set protocol parameters so that the repudiation probability,
the forging probability, and the failure probability are all
approximately equal. In this way, the probability that the
scheme will fail in any one of these ways is bounded by
PðfailureÞ ≤ 2 exp

−
g2
16
L

; ð1Þ
where g ¼ Cmin − perr is the advantage that the legitimate
sender Alice has over a forger for a single position of the
signature sequence [22,23]. Since the failure probability
decays exponentially with the signature length L, the
scheme is secure, and any required security level can be
achieved with sufficiently large L. The figure of merit
we use to characterize the quality of our QDS schemes is
the length 2L required to sign a one-bit message with a
failure probability of 0.01%.
To show the robustness of the protocol, the experiment
was carried out over a real free-space urban link [32,33].
The signal states j  αi, j  iαi were then repeatedly
transmitted, polarization multiplexed with the local oscil-
lator, which is needed for later detection, through a free-
space channel between the buildings of the Max Planck
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Institute and the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg [32–34].
The length of the channel is approximately 1.6 km. The
channel transmission fluctuated between 50% and 85% due
to beam wandering and scintillation. At the receiver
the signal was split on a balanced beam splitter to measure
both the xˆ and pˆ quadratures. Simultaneously, the trans-
mission was recorded for each state (for more details see
Ref. [22]). The experiment was implemented for three
different signal amplitudes, α ¼ 0.48, α ¼ 0.93, and
α ¼ 1.63, and we attribute the first (second) half of the
measurement time to Bob (Charlie). To remedy the channel
fading, Bob’s (Charlie’s) measurement data are then sorted
into 32 subchannels according to the measured trans-
mission [32,33]. Depending on the sign of the quadrature
measurement values, for each signal state, two of the
possible sent states were eliminated.
For each set of data, the sequence of eliminated states
was used to produce a cost matrix [31] that gives the
probability that each state was eliminated for a particular
signal state. For each cost matrix, we calculate the mini-
mum difference between an off-diagonal element of the
cost matrix (probability of eliminating a state that was not
sent) and the diagonal element of that row (probability of
eliminating the sent state). This difference was multiplied
by the appropriate pmin to obtain the parameter g from
Eq. (1) for that cost matrix. The minimum probability that a
forger will incorrectly identify the state is pmin (see
Ref. [22]). For each g, the signature length 2L to sign a
one-bit message with a failure probability of 0.01% was
calculated. In Fig. 2, the length L is plotted against
transmission T with T þ R ¼ 1 for α ¼ 0.48.
To account for experimental imperfections, a theoretical
model was developed, using only experimental data, with
no free parameters (for details see the Supplemental
Material [22]). The larger errors bars in Fig. 2 are mostly
due to the statistical error of the smaller amount of data
available at lower transmission. The experiment has a clock
rate of about 2.2 MHz and the required signature length of
about 105 is easily manageable in the subchannels; thus this
demonstrates a viable QDS scheme.
The experiment was also carried out at α ¼ 0.93 and
α ¼ 1.63 (results given in Ref. [22]). Increasing α improves
the cost matrix but also decreases pmin, which makes the
guess of the forger easier. There is a trade-off between these
two effects, with the optimal α predicted to be α ≈ 0.5,
supported by the experimental results.
The main purpose of this experiment is as a test of
the measurement procedure used. A calculation of the
cost matrix provides all the information relevant for imple-
menting a full scheme. In the experiment, all the quantum
steps were carried out; the rest is classical communication
and information processing. The experiment is also the first
to demonstrate a signature scheme in a free-space setting, in
contrast to previous experiments using optical fibers.
It is important to compare the performance of this scheme
to previous results. In Ref. [23], a similar scheme is
presented, but with unambiguous state elimination rather
than the “continuous-variable ambiguous state elimination”
used here. There, the signature length required was about
109, for 500 m of optical fiber and a total loss level of 35%.
Comparing this to our results, the signature lengthwas about
7 × 104 with a similar loss level and a 1.6 km free-space
channel. In Ref. [23], the experiment ran at a clock rate of
100 MHz, whereas the clock rate of this experiment was
2.2 MHz. Increasing the clock rate into the GHz range is
straightforward with available technology and the authors
have recently demonstrated a continuous-variable system,
capable of distributing quantum states at GHz rates [35].
Figure 3 shows the dependence of signature lengths from
transmission for the two schemes (details of the models
given in Ref. [22]). Even including experimental errors, our
FIG. 2. Signature length for α ¼ 0.48. Blue curve: theoretical
model. Blue dots and bars: results from the data attributed to Bob.
Red triangles and bars: results from the data attributed to Charlie.
The error bars calculated are derived by investigating the standard
deviation of ten subsets of the entire data set. The errors naturally
increase with decreasing transmission since g from Eq. (1)
decreases. In addition, less data was available at lower trans-
mission values (see histogram of signals received by Bob per
transmission subchannel as inset). The data used for each point
comes from a small range of transmissions, but horizontal error
bars are omitted for clarity.
FIG. 3. Black (solid) curve: Signature length for an ideal
ambiguous measurement scheme. Red (dotted) curve: Signature
length for an ambiguous measurement scheme with realistic
imperfections. Blue (dot-dashed) curve: Signature length for an
ideal unambiguous measurement scheme.
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scheme requires a shorter signature than the ideal result for
Ref. [23]. That is, the QDS protocol based on ambiguous
state elimination has a fundamental advantage over unam-
biguous state elimination. This advantage is even more
pronounced when experimental inefficiencies are taken into
account. Approximately 1 order of magnitude of the
advantage comes purely from the chosen measurement,
as shown in Fig. 3. The rest comes from the improved
technical performance of heterodyne measurements com-
pared to single-photon detectors. Notably, heterodyne
detection is more compatible with modern telecommuni-
cation networks, than single photon detection, furthering its
appeal and holding promise to move to GHz rates and
higher transmission ranges. The improvement in signature
length is the greatest, a factor of 10 shorter, for a trans-
mission of 10%. This indicates that heterodyne measure-
ments may be more robust against losses.
In conclusion, we have presented a QDS scheme that
uses heterodyne measurements. We have experimentally
demonstrated that the scheme works over a fluctuating free-
space channel, which is the first free-space realization for
quantum signatures. In addition, the signature rate per
quantum state sent is orders of magnitude better than in
previous comparable work. Heterodyne detection used for
ambiguous state elimination gives a result for each sent
state. Interestingly, this overcompensates the increased
error probability and leads to an overall better performance
compared to unambiguous measurements.
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